Alaskans have been begging, since Alaska’s oil pipeline was completed in the 1970’s, for a gasline project. Long-time Alaskans remember the bumper sticker: “Please God Grant Us One More Pipeline, We Promise To Not Piss It Away This Time.”

Alaska’s gasline project, Alaska LNG, would sell liquified natural gas (LNG) to Asian markets. But is the gasline more likely now than nearly 50 years ago?

A Canadian competitor

Canada has a competitor project called LNG Canada Development. Kitimat, B.C., its export terminal, lies in Western British Columbia, just south from Ketchikan, Alaska. The project’s first phase 420-mile pipeline currently distributes, by LNG tankers, about 1.8 billion cubic feet per day (1.8 bcf/d) with capacity of about 2.1 bcf/d from Dawson Creek to Kitimat, on North America’s West Coast.

LNG tanker shipping costs from Kitimat to Asian markets are similar to those from Southcentral Alaska, especially compared to shipping to Asian markets from U.S. Gulf coast, Kuwait, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia.

LNG Canada is a joint venture of the following owners:

• Shell, the world’s fifth largest oil company – 40%
• Petronas, Malaysian state-owned oil and gas company – 25%
• PetroChina, third largest oil and gas company – 15%
• Mitsubishi, a Japanese firm controlling most imports into Japan – 15%
• KOGAS, the world’s largest LNG importer and South Korea LNG provider – 5%.

LNG Canada’s first shipment left Kitimat for Asian markets in July 2025. The first LNG tanker, the Maran Gas Roxana, a 204-meter tanker, completed project testing. Canadian Natural Resource Minister Jonathan Wilkinson said, “The need to build a resilient economy with new export opportunities for Canadian energy suppliers has never been clearer.”

Canada LNG is the largest single private sector investment in Canadian history. The first phase of Canada’s gas pipeline will ship almost 2 billion cubic feet per day. The first and second phases combined potential is about 4 bcf/d to Asian markets.

Toho Gas and Tokyo Gas, two Japanese utilities, signed commitments with Mitsubishi, an LNG Canada owner: Toho for 15 years and Tokyo Gas commitment for 13 years.

Alaska major oil companies withdrew

The withdrawal of ExxonMobil, BP, and ConocoPhillips from Alaska LNG manifests core concerns as to the project’s profitability and/or market viability. Additionally, Alaska cannot ignore that Exxon, BP and Conoco have significant investment in LNG resources in the Permian Basin in Texas. Those oil heavy hitters likely do not want Alaska LNG to compete with their Texas LNG investments, including LNG export capacity from Texas to the world.

The fear, in the 1950’s at the time of Alaska’s statehood, of foreign companies acquiring Alaskan resource interests to not build/not develop them in order to prevent Alaska’s resources from harming their investments elsewhere seems prescient today.

No binding deals for Alaska LNG

Alaska LNG has not received binding, signed commercial deals with Japan, South Korea, or Asian markets. Japan has reduced its LNG demand over the past decade and is now reselling more LNG. The Japan Gas Association announced that private companies – not political leaders – procure LNG for Japan, suggesting that project costs and economic certainty are forefront to Japanese LNG import contracts.

Alaska’s customers must be primarily Japan, South Korea, and China. Alaskans should consider the likelihood that Asian markets might prefer Canada LNG over Alaska LNG. With Canada LNG, those countries have ownership interests in an operating investment. Asian markets will buy LNG from a joint venture controlled, in part, by their own countries.

Alaska LNG project is expensive

It’s expensive to build. $70 billion or more wouldn’t be surprising. Total Alaska LNG project costs are not known. Potential buyers do not sign long term contracts, requiring them to buy fixed quantities from a pipeline, without knowing costs. Just because it can be built does not mean it will be – economic market forces control.

Tariffs create economic uncertainty

Trump’s tariff increases upend the global trading system. Economic uncertainty has increased. Tariffs can be viewed as the U.S. pushing other countries away or even economic warfare. The U.S. may now be a trading partner of last resort for many countries. Future LNG purchasers may now buy from the U.S. only what they can’t get elsewhere. Current buyers of U.S. LNG may threaten to stop those purchases.

Tariffs have been on-again/off-again, paused, reduced, or increased with little understood as to plan or policy. LNG buyers may avoid the risk of future U.S. economic leverage over them, from dependency upon an American energy source. Politics can produce strange outcomes.

Conclusion: Alaska’s gas line is a looong, long-shot.

Born in Fairbanks, Joe Paskvan served in the State Senate from 2009-2013. He holds an undergraduate degree from the University of Alaska, Fairbanks and a law degree from Seattle University School of Law. He is now retired after working four decades as a lawyer.